



30 May 2024  
EMA/CHMP/BWP/303353/2010 Rev 3  
Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP)

## CHMP Reflection paper on Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and plasma-derived and urine-derived medicinal products

Draft agreed by Biologics Working Party	12 September 2018
Adopted by CHMP for release for consultation	18 October 2018
End of consultation (deadline for comments)	31 October 2019
Agreed by Biologics Working Party	17 April 2024
Adopted by CHMP	30 May 2024

This CHMP reflection paper replaces the CHMP position statement on Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and plasma-derived and urine-derived medicinal products (EMA/CHMP/BWP/303353/2010)

<b>Keywords</b>	Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, human Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies, plasma-derived medicinal products, urine-derived medicinal products, sporadic CJD, genetic CJD, iatrogenic CJD, variant CJD, blood infectivity, transmissibility
-----------------	--



# CHMP Reflection paper on Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and plasma-derived and urine-derived medicinal products

## Table of contents

<b>Executive summary .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1. Introduction .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2. Human TSEs current status .....</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1. Sporadic, genetic and iatrogenic forms of human TSEs .....	5
2.2. Variant CJD .....	5
<b>3. Human tissue of infectivity/abnormal prion protein.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>4. Infectivity in blood and transmissibility via blood .....</b>	<b>8</b>
4.1. Animal blood Heading .....	8
4.2. Human blood .....	10
<b>5. Detection techniques .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>6. Leucoreduction and specific prion affinity filters .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>7. Manufacturing processes for plasma-derived medicinal products.....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>8. Infectivity in urine .....</b>	<b>15</b>
8.1. Animal urine.....	15
8.2. Human urine .....	16
<b>9. Recommendations and proposals .....</b>	<b>16</b>
9.1. Sporadic, genetic and iatrogenic CJD and plasma-derived medicinal products .....	16
9.2. Variant CJD and plasma-derived medicinal products .....	17
9.2.1 Exclusion Criteria.....	17
9.2.2. Leucoreduction and specific prion affinity filters .....	19
9.2.3. Manufacturing processes for plasma-derived medicinal products.....	19
9.2.4. Recall of batches where information becomes available post-donation.....	21
9.2.5. Albumin used as an excipient or in manufacturing processes.....	22
9.2.6. Substitution with alternative products.....	22
9.3. Urine-derived medicinal products .....	22
<b>References .....</b>	<b>23</b>

This is the fourth revision of the CHMP Reflection paper on “Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and plasma derived and urine-derived medicinal products”. It was originally published in February 2003 (EMA/CPMP/BWP/2879/02), replacing the CPMP Position Statement on “New variant CJD and plasma-derived medicinal products” (CPMP/201/98) from February 1998. EMA/CPMP/BWP/2879/02 was revised in June 2004 (EMA/CPMP/BWP/2879/02 rev 1.), in June 2011 (EMA/CHMP/BWP/303353/2010) and in May 2024 (EMA/CHMP/BWP/303353/2010 Rev 3).

## Executive summary

The purpose of this revision is to account for scientific and epidemiological developments since the last revision in 2011.

Emergence of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) was noted in UK in 1996. The number of cases has been in decline in the UK since 2001 and the last known UK case was reported in 2016. Studies on appendix tissues from the UK originally indicated a potential high prevalence of infected persons and this raised concerns considering a potential high number of asymptomatic carriers with infectious blood. However, the initially postulated second wave from persons of less susceptible genetic background and prolonged incubation period has not been observed to date and no transfusion-transmitted infections have been reported from the UK since 1999. Therefore, the recommendation that donors, who have spent a cumulative period of 1 year or more in the UK between the beginning of 1980 and at the end of 1996 should be excluded from donating blood/plasma for fractionation, is no longer maintained.

There is no change in the recommendations for precautionary recall of batches of plasma-derived medicinal products where a donor to a plasma pool subsequently develops vCJD. Clarification has been added with regards to cases where a post mortem differentiation between vCJD and other types of CJD is not possible or not yet available. In such cases, it can be justified not to recall affected batches or product intermediates upon risk assessment including the epidemiology, clinical data from the donor, and prion reduction capacity of the manufacturing process.

The recommendation not to recall batches of plasma-derived medicinal products where a donor is later confirmed as having sporadic (sCJD), genetic (gCJD) or iatrogenic CJD (iCJD) is maintained, provided the manufacturer has demonstrated using appropriate methodology, that the process includes steps which significantly minimize the risk of prion contamination of the final product.

No recommendation for testing of donors was made in the former version of this reflection paper and this policy is maintained.

No requirement for leucoreduction of plasma was made in the former version of this reflection paper and this policy is maintained.

The requirement to estimate prion reduction capacity of the manufacturing process is maintained. The available data support the reduction of infectivity during manufacture of plasma-derived medicinal products and prion reduction capacity is considered an important factor for the safety of these products. Although vCJD cases have been declining, producing purified plasma proteins using steps that reduce prions is considered a precautionary measure for potentially re-emerging vCJD cases or other blood-transmitted prion diseases that might emerge in future. Considering the very long incubation period and severity of prion diseases, it is important to maintain precautionary measures as far as possible.

There is no change to the recommendations for urine-derived medicinal products.

# 1. Introduction

Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is a rare neurodegenerative disease belonging to the group of human Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs) or prion diseases. The mortality rate of TSEs ranges approximately from 1.5 to 2 persons per million population per year. TSEs can occur worldwide sporadically (sporadic CJD (sCJD)), variably proteinase sensitive prionopathy and sporadic fatal insomnia), be associated with mutations of the prion protein gene (genetic TSEs (gTSE)) or result from medical exposure to infectious material (iatrogenic CJD (iCJD)). In 1996, a variant form of CJD (vCJD) was identified<sup>1</sup>. There is strong evidence that vCJD is caused by the agent responsible for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle<sup>2,3,4</sup>. The most likely hypothesis is that vCJD has occurred through exposure to BSE contaminated food.

Human TSEs, including in particular vCJD, were addressed in several expert meetings/workshops at the EMA between January 1998 and December 2000<sup>5c, 5d</sup>. A CPMP Position Statement on vCJD and plasma-derived medicinal products was issued in February 1998<sup>5e</sup> and the outcome of the subsequent meetings was published on the EMA website. An EMA Expert Workshop on Human TSEs and Medicinal Products was held on 19-21 June 2002. This provided the scientific basis for a new CPMP Position Statement issued in 2003<sup>5b</sup>. A further EMA Expert Workshop was held in January 2004 to review the current state of knowledge of vCJD, in the light of a report of a possible human transmission by blood transfusion<sup>6</sup>. In addition, the Workshop discussed the CPMP Discussion document on the investigation of manufacturing processes with respect to vCJD<sup>5a</sup>. In October 2005, a follow-up workshop was held to discuss the number of vCJD cases reported in France and other European countries and the potential effect of additional donor exclusion measures. Urine-derived medicinal products were specifically discussed at an EMA expert workshop in July 2007<sup>5f</sup> after publication of experiments indicating transmission of infection via urine using a hamster model. A revised version of the CPMP position statement was published in 2011<sup>5g</sup>.

Blood and blood components for transfusion are outside the scope of this Reflection Paper. Recommendations on the suitability of blood and plasma donors and the screening of donated blood in the European Community were described in Council Recommendation 98/463/EC<sup>7c</sup>. European legislation on human blood and blood components entered into force on 8 February 2003<sup>7a</sup>. Under this legislation, a Commission Directive on certain technical requirements for blood and blood components, including eligibility criteria for donors, entered into force in April 2004<sup>7b</sup>.

In addition, Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (95) 15 contains a technical appendix on the use, preparation and quality assurance of blood components and details the current requirements for donors<sup>8</sup>.

In December 2003, following the announcement of a possible case of vCJD transmission by blood transfusion, Commissioner Byrne made a statement highlighting EU activities in the area of vCJD and announcing a meeting of the Working Group of the Blood Regulatory Committee to consider the latest information available from the UK<sup>7d</sup>. The meeting took place in January 2004 and a summary statement was produced<sup>7e</sup>.

The Scientific Steering Committee (SSC), the Scientific Committee on Medicinal Products and Medical Devices (SCMPMD) and the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) of the European Commission have published a number of opinions relating to TSEs, which are of relevance to blood and blood components for transfusion, as well as to plasma-derived medicinal products<sup>9</sup>. WHO Guidelines on TSEs are also of relevance to both blood components for transfusion and plasma-derived medicinal products as well as urine-derived medicinal products<sup>10</sup>. The Council of Europe has made recommendations for blood and blood components for transfusion<sup>11a</sup>.

In February 2021, the UK government lifted its ban on the use of UK plasma for the manufacturing of immunoglobulin products and, in 2022, both the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) removed existing restrictions on blood and plasma donors who had previously been temporary residents of or visitors to the UK. In light of these developments, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) published risk assessments in 2021<sup>11b</sup> and 2023<sup>11c</sup> considering donations for blood and blood components while plasma-derived medicinal products have been excluded from the scope of these documents. Blood components have been subjected to a separate risk assessment by ECDC outlining considerations for transfusion while this reflection paper considers additional risk-reducing factors specific for plasma-derived medicinal products such as prion reduction during manufacture.

The purpose of this revision is to update the reflection paper according to the scientific developments since the last revision in 2011. These include developments in detection techniques, studies on the tissue distribution of CJD agents, and a study indicating that blood from some patients with sCJD might contain prion infectivity. It also considers current epidemiological findings noting a decline of vCJD cases worldwide.

## **2. Human TSEs current status**

### **2.1. Sporadic, genetic and iatrogenic forms of human TSEs**

There is no firm evidence that sporadic, genetic or iatrogenic forms of human TSEs have been transmitted from person to person through exposure to plasma-derived medicinal products or urine-derived medicinal products. Systematic surveillance for CJD of all types has been undertaken in a number of countries, including a collaborative study in the EU since 1993,<sup>12,13</sup> and no case of sporadic, genetic or iatrogenic CJD has been causally linked to prior treatment with plasma products. Two plasma product recipients in the UK have been diagnosed with sporadic CJD<sup>14</sup>. Both were aged 64 years and had been exposed to UK sourced plasma products, one for the treatment of von Willebrand's disease and the other Haemophilia B. Both patients had received, in addition to plasma products, multiple blood transfusions, but a partial look-back study performed for one patient has not identified a donor with either sCJD or vCJD. A causal link between the treatment with plasma products and the development of sCJD has not been established and there is a possibility that both cases may reflect a chance event in the context of systematic surveillance of CJD in large populations<sup>14</sup>.

Cases of sporadic CJD with a history of drug treatment for infertility have not been identified but there is uncertainty about the validity of this observation (see the report of the 2007 EMA expert meeting for further details)<sup>5f</sup>. The strength of epidemiological evidence excluding transmission by urine-derived medicinal products is less secure than in other forms of human prion disease.

Variably proteinase sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr) is an idiopathic disorder with patients having no known risk factors for acquired or genetic prion disease. Recent laboratory studies have indicated limited transmissibility to transgenic mice, with transmission characteristics distinct from sporadic CJD<sup>15,16</sup>.

### **2.2. Variant CJD**

As of September 2023, 233 clinical cases of definite or probable vCJD have been reported worldwide, in individuals from 12 countries, with the highest number of cases (178 cases) reported from the UK<sup>11c, 17</sup>. Outside of the UK, there have been cases in France (29 cases), Spain (5 cases), Republic of Ireland (4 cases), USA (4 cases), Italy (3 cases), Netherlands (3 cases), Portugal (2 cases), Canada (2 cases), Taiwan (1 case), Saudi Arabia (1 case) and Japan (1 case)<sup>11c, 17</sup>. Some of these cases, namely

two of the Irish cases, two of the US cases, one French case, one Canadian case and the Taiwanese case had spent more than 6 months in the UK during the period 1980-1996 and were probably infected while in the UK<sup>19</sup>. The third and fourth US cases and the second Canadian case have been reported as most likely infected when living outside the USA and Canada. The possibility of cases occurring in other countries cannot be excluded.

Two cases of vCJD identified in Spain occurred in the same family. No family links have been reported in any other vCJD cases to date. The last known UK case of vCJD was reported in 2016, with a clinical onset in 2014. To date, no vCJD cases have been identified in the UK among individuals born after 1989<sup>18</sup>. The latest non-UK cases were reported in Italy, in 2016, and in France in 2019 (onset of disease in 2018) and 2021. These three cases affected persons who had worked in laboratories handling vCJD/BSE agents and a laboratory accident reported in one case<sup>11c, 20</sup>.

In 2016, a definite case of variant CJD was reported in the UK with a heterozygous codon 129 genotype, raising concerns of a further outbreak or a "second wave" of cases with this genetic background<sup>21</sup>.

Of the 178 vCJD cases in the UK, 161 were genetically tested. Only the one case of vCJD confirmed in 2016 was methionine/valine (MV) heterozygous at codon 129 of the prion protein (PRNP) gene, while the remaining 160 definite or probable vCJD cases were methionine homozygous (MM). The 2019 case in France was reported to be homozygous (MM) at codon 129<sup>20</sup>.

Available data clearly indicate that vCJD incidence in the UK and internationally is in decline.

A UK study screening specimens from surgically removed appendices and tonsils for accumulation of disease related prion protein in the lymphoreticular system, has been carried out in order to try and obtain some estimation of the number of people that might be incubating vCJD in the UK<sup>22</sup>. Three positive appendix specimens were found as a result of the screening of 12,674 appendix and tonsil specimens. However, the pattern of lymphoreticular accumulation in two of these samples was dissimilar from that seen in known cases of vCJD, raising the possibility that they may be false positives. With respect to this possibility, the authors comment that although it is uncertain whether immunohistochemical accumulation of disease-related prion protein in the lymphoreticular system is specific for vCJD, it has not been described in any other disease, including other forms of human prion disease or a range of inflammatory and infective conditions. Subsequent genetic analysis of residual tissue samples from these 2 cases found that both were valine homozygotes at codon 129 in the prion protein gene<sup>23</sup>. This finding might account for the immunohistochemical features in these cases; none of the patients who have developed vCJD and have undergone a comparable genetic analysis have been valine homozygotes at codon 129 in the prion protein gene.

Statistical analysis on this finding of 3 positive specimens gave the following estimations of numbers who may be incubating vCJD in the UK: 237 infections per million population (95% confidence interval (CI): 49-692 per million). These estimations were higher than predictions from modelling of the clinical data in 2003 (upper 95% confidence interval of 540 future cases)<sup>24</sup> and do not reflect the actual epidemiological data.

A larger study of an archive of tonsil tissue from 63,007 people of all ages removed during routine tonsillectomies has been published<sup>25</sup>. In this study, 12,753 samples were from the 1961-1985 birth cohort in which most cases of vCJD have arisen and 19,808 were from the 1986-1995 birth cohort, that may also have been orally exposed to bovine spongiform encephalopathy. None of the samples were unequivocally reactive to two enzyme immunoassays and none of the initial reactive samples were positive for disease-related prion protein (PrP) by immunohistochemistry or immunoblotting. The estimated 95% confidence interval for the prevalence of disease-related PrP in the 1961-1995 birth cohort was 0-113 per million and in the 1961-1985 birth cohort, 0-289 per million. These estimates are

lower than the previous study of appendix tissue but are still consistent with that study. To confirm the reliability of the results from the 1961-85 birth cohort, 10,075 of these samples were investigated further by immunohistochemistry on paraffin-embedded tonsil tissues using two anti-PrP monoclonal antibodies<sup>26</sup>.

One specimen showed a single positive follicle with both antibodies on 2 slides from adjacent sections, although the earlier enzyme immunoassays and immunoblotting studies on the frozen tissue samples from this case were negative<sup>25, 26</sup>. If this case is now accepted as positive for abnormal PrP (since the findings were similar to those of the three positive cases in the earlier study of Hilton et al in 2004<sup>22</sup>), it gives a prevalence of disease-related PrP in the UK population of 109 per million, with a 95% confidence interval of 3-608 per million, which is not statistically significantly different (exact  $p = 0.63$ ) from the population prevalence based on the finding of 3 positives in the Hilton et al study<sup>22, 26</sup>. If the case is not accepted as a positive, this gives a prevalence of 0 out of 9160, with a 95% confidence interval of 0-403 per million for the 1961-85 cohort, which is also not significantly different (exact  $p = 0.25$ ) from the findings of the Hilton et al study<sup>22</sup>. A more recent study from 2013 included 32,441 appendix samples and 16 were positive leading to an estimated prevalence in the UK population of 492 cases per million, with wide confidence intervals. All three PRNP codon 129 genotypes were identified among the 16 positive samples with a relative excess of the VV genotype<sup>27</sup>.

The results of further UK prevalence studies of appendix tissues derived from individuals either before the BSE epidemic or after the introduction of further measures to restrict BSE in the food chain have revealed a finding that would necessitate human exposure having begun in the late 1970s and continuing through the late 1990s. Appendix-III survey data have not produced a clear answer to the question of whether abnormal prions detected by immunohistochemistry in the British population is limited to those exposed to the BSE epizootic, and various interpretations are possible.<sup>28</sup> The contrast between the estimated prevalence of vCJD from these studies and the reported number of clinical vCJD cases seen to date strongly suggests that those in whom PrP<sup>TSE</sup> is detected through an antemortem lymphoid tissue survey may never develop any symptoms of prion disease<sup>11b</sup>. Considering indications for incubation periods with Kuru and iCJD as well as experience with animal models, it was noted that there still could be persons with an extremely long incubation period<sup>11b, 11c</sup>. However, it was also concluded that uncertainty exists regarding the extent to which individuals, who may be carrying PrPSc as latent or subclinical vCJD infection, are capable of transmitting the infection<sup>11b, 11d</sup>. Considering that no further vCJD cases have been reported in UK from 2016 until 2023 and that no transmission of vCJD via blood has been reported since 1999, it raises questions about the specificity of these findings from the Appendix studies or relevance in predicting future vCJD cases or transmission of disease via blood.

### **3. Human tissue distribution of infectivity/abnormal prion protein**

Tissue distribution has been investigated by detection of the abnormal PrP<sup>TSE</sup> or by infectivity assays. Detection of PrP<sup>TSE</sup> in tissues has often been associated with infectivity, however it should be noted that infectivity can be present without detection of PrP<sup>TSE</sup>,<sup>29</sup> or PrP<sup>TSE</sup> can be present in the absence of infectivity<sup>30</sup> and that the relation between the amount of PrP<sup>TSE</sup> and infectivity is strain dependent<sup>31</sup>. The reason for this finding is not known but may be related to limitations of assay methods for PrP<sup>TSE</sup> or different ratios between protease-resistant and protease-sensitive PrP<sup>TSE</sup> isoforms<sup>32, 33</sup>. It is thus recommended that any study on tissue or fluid distribution of the abnormal prion protein be confirmed with an infectivity assay.

A wider distribution and higher level of PrP<sup>TSE</sup> in human peripheral tissues, including the lymphoreticular system, has been found in vCJD compared with sporadic CJD<sup>34, 35, 36</sup>. The magnitude of PrP<sup>TSE</sup> may vary

however, as a case of vCJD reported extremely low levels of PrP<sup>TSE</sup> in lymphoreticular tissues<sup>37</sup> and another study showed equal amounts of PrP<sup>TSE</sup> in vCJD and sporadic CJD<sup>38</sup>. Limited data from infectivity assays of vCJD tissues are consistent with the PrP<sup>TSE</sup> findings<sup>39</sup>. In clinical vCJD cases, high titres of infectivity are found in the brain and spinal cord and lower levels in spleen and tonsil<sup>39, 40</sup>. vCJD infectivity was detected in spleen but not in the brain from an individual with the methionine-valine (MV) genotype<sup>41</sup>. While PrP<sup>TSE</sup> and infectivity are occasionally found in the spleen of sporadic CJD, the levels of PrP<sup>TSE</sup> are lower than in vCJD. PrP<sup>TSE</sup> accumulations have been observed in muscles of some patients with both sporadic and variant CJD<sup>42</sup>.

Interestingly, the results of a study published in 2017, suggest that the range of medical procedures that might result in iatrogenic transmission of vCJD might be larger than for sCJD<sup>42b</sup>. In this study, the distribution and level of the vCJD agent was estimated in tissues from confirmed vCJD cases and vCJD prions were found in a wide variety of peripheral tissues<sup>42b</sup>.

As indicated earlier, variations in distribution and levels reported in different publications may be caused by limitations of the assay methods. One study reported that the distribution of PrP<sup>TSE</sup> in iCJD is more similar to sCJD than vCJD<sup>35</sup>. Data are lacking for gCJD.

## **4. Infectivity in blood and transmissibility via blood**

### **4.1. Animal blood**

In early 2000, most of the knowledge relating to the presence of prion infectivity in blood relied on information from rodent prion disease models. In these experimental systems, prion infectivity titres were reported to vary between 1 and 10 ID<sub>50</sub>/mL of blood during the asymptomatic phase and up to 100 ID<sub>50</sub>/mL during the clinical phase of the disease<sup>43, 44</sup>. Infectious prion titres were measured by bioassay performing intracerebral inoculation of blood, or blood fractions from the same animal species to indicator animals, (i.e. autologous combinations of inocula and animal bioassay). The observed infectious prion titres were equivalent to the level of infectivity found in 10<sup>-6</sup> - 10<sup>-8</sup> g of brain tissue from animals at the terminal stage of prion disease. It was found that approximately 40% of the prion infectivity was associated with the buffy coat fraction, the remainder was found principally in plasma<sup>45, 46</sup>.

Platelets from hamster blood were shown to have little, if any, prion infectivity<sup>47</sup>. Subsequent experiments in other animal species, whereby donor blood material was assessed by bioassay in a host via intracerebral inoculation, have investigated the distribution of prion infectivity in various blood fractions. Infectivity has also been detected in buffy coat of a prosimian microcebe<sup>48</sup> and in whole blood of a macaque experimentally infected with a macaque-adapted BSE strain<sup>49</sup> and in red blood cells of two macaques experimentally infected with a macaque-adapted vCJD strain<sup>49</sup>. In sheep, naturally or experimentally infected with scrapie, infectious prion titres in whole blood were similar to those observed in rodents (<35 ID<sub>50</sub>/mL) when measured by bioassay in reporter ovine PrP transgenic mice<sup>50</sup>. Prion infectivity was detected in plasma from scrapie-infected sheep, but at a lower proportion to that found in the blood of prion-diseased mice and hamster models<sup>51</sup>. Moreover, a prion infectivity was detected in sheep platelets and infectivity associated with leukocytes was not reduced by washing of these cells<sup>50</sup>. Similar observations were reported in deer naturally infected with chronic wasting disease<sup>52</sup>.

The intracerebral inoculation of prions is unlikely to recapitulate the cellular and molecular events that occur as a consequence of prion infection by blood transfusion, a process that involves the



administration of large numbers of viable cells and/or a large volume of material intravenously injected into the recipient.

#### Sheep transfusion model:

The relative similarity in size between sheep and humans allows the transfusion of sheep blood volumes that are relevant to human medicine. In addition, the pathogenesis of vCJD mirrors features similar to natural classical scrapie in sheep, for example the presence of prions in peripheral lymphoid tissue of affected individuals. Consequently, sheep prion disease models were considered to be relevant models for the assessment of the risks associated with vCJD blood-borne transmission<sup>53</sup>.

In early 2000, transfusion of whole blood collected from asymptomatic sheep infected with either natural scrapie or experimental BSE resulted in prion transmission to recipient sheep<sup>54, 55</sup>.

Using the sheep transfusion model, it was also confirmed that RBCs, plasma, platelets and buffy coat prepared by similar protocols to those used in transfusion medicine can transmit prion disease<sup>56, 57</sup>.

In two different sheep scrapie models, the transfusion of 200 mL of whole blood collected during the early preclinical phase of the condition (3 months post infection) was able to transmit the disease with 100% efficacy<sup>50, 56</sup>. However, in two other sheep prion disease studies, the efficacy of transmission after transfusion of ca. 400 mL of whole blood at a late stage of incubation of the disease was limited to 19%<sup>55</sup> or 40%<sup>57</sup> respectively<sup>55</sup>. Transfusion experiments carried out in a sheep scrapie model demonstrated that the transfusion of 200 µL of prion-infected whole blood has an apparent 100% efficacy for disease transmission and that 100µL blood transfusion is still sufficient to transmit the disease in a proportion of the recipients<sup>51</sup>. However, these data should be taken with caution with regard to its relevance to the risk of vCJD transmission as the data were obtained with a rapid scrapie strain (PG127). These experiments also indicated that, despite their apparent low infectious titre, the intravenous administration of white blood cells (WBC) resulted in efficient disease transmission. The intravenous administration of 10<sup>5</sup> WBCs were sufficient to cause scrapie in recipient sheep. Cell-sorted CD45R+ (predominantly B lymphocytes), CD4+/CD8+ (T lymphocytes) and CD14+ (monocytes/macrophages) blood cell sub-populations were all shown to contain prion infectivity by bioassays in ovine PrP-transgenic mice<sup>58</sup>. However, while the intravenous administration of 10<sup>6</sup> CD45+ or CD4/8+ living cells were able to transmit the disease, similar numbers of CD14+ failed to infect any of their recipients.

This indicated that blood cell populations display different abilities to transmit TSE by the transfusion route.

Features of the different sheep prion disease models, such as age of animals used, PrP genotype of the animals and/or the prion strain used for inoculation could contribute to an explanation for the discrepancies between the results of these different models. However, these sheep blood transfusion studies collectively suggest that in a proportion of prion-infected blood donors, the level of prionemia may be insufficient to allow prion disease transmission by blood transfusion<sup>59</sup>.

### Detection techniques:

PrP<sup>TSE</sup> has been detected in blood components of TSE-infected animals by different techniques. In TSE-infected rodents, PrP<sup>TSE</sup> positivity has been reported in buffy coat<sup>60</sup> and plasma exosomes<sup>61</sup> by Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (PMCA), whole blood by Real-Time Quaking induced Conversion Assay (RT-QuIC)<sup>62</sup>, and by steel-binding assay<sup>63</sup> and in plasma exosomes by standard Western Blot (WB) procedures<sup>64</sup>.

Abnormal PrP conformers can be detected throughout the whole incubation period of the disease<sup>63</sup>. In pre-clinical and clinical scrapie-infected or BSE infected sheep, PrP<sup>TSE</sup> positivity has been reported in platelets and WBC by PMCA or infectivity assay<sup>50, 65, 66</sup> or surface-FIDA (fluorescence intensity distribution analysis)<sup>64</sup>. In chronic wasting disease (CWD)-infected deer, whole blood was PrP<sup>TSE</sup> positive by RT-QuIC in animals in both, pre-clinical and clinical phases of disease<sup>52</sup>. Plasma, buffy coat and WBC tested PrP<sup>TSE</sup> positive by PMCA in vCJD-infected macaques during the earliest pre-clinical and clinical phases of disease<sup>64, 67, 68</sup>.

## **4.2. Human blood**

### vCJD:

The tracing of recipients of blood transfusion from UK donors who have subsequently developed vCJD (the Transfusion Medicine Epidemiology Medicine Review, TMER study) has revealed four instances of secondary transmission<sup>69</sup>. These individuals had received transfusion of non-leucodepleted red cells from donors who were clinically healthy at the time of donation but subsequently (17–40 months later) developed variant CJD. Three of the four patients developed disease after incubation periods ranging from 6.5 to 8.5 years; the fourth died of an illness unrelated to prion disease 5 years after transfusion. This asymptomatic prion-infected patient was heterozygous (methionine/valine) at codon 129 of the PRNP gene. However, the spleen and lymph nodes tested positive<sup>70</sup> and the prion agent was experimentally transmitted from brain and spleen to humanised transgenic mice<sup>71</sup>. Taken together, these instances are strong evidence that vCJD is transmissible through blood, at least when transfusing whole blood or non-leucoreduced erythrocyte concentrates. Since 1999, exclusively leucoreduced blood components have been transfused in the UK and no further transfusion-transmitted vCJD cases have been reported in the UK. This indicates that the epidemiological risk for infectious blood donations in the UK or the infectious level in such components has been negligible while it could be also argued that absence of transfusion-transmitted infection is due to leucoreduction. However, considering that, in animal experiments, only limited removal of infectivity during leucoreduction (see section below) is observed, the conclusion could be drawn that the number of carriers of infectious blood in the UK has been very low.

In 2010, another presumed case of asymptomatic vCJD infection was identified in an elderly haemophilia patient who was heterozygous at codon 129 in the prion protein gene<sup>72</sup>. The patient, who died of unrelated pathology, had received large quantities of UK-sourced fractionated plasma products (i.e. intermediate purity FVIII for which prion reduction during manufacture might have been low), including some units derived from plasma pools which contained plasma from a donor who later developed variant CJD. This patient was identified through an intensive search for PrP<sup>TSE</sup> positivity in a range of post-mortem tissues, only 1 of 26 samples taken from the spleen tested positive. Whether someone with this limited distribution of PrP<sup>TSE</sup> would be infectious is unknown. While from a public health perspective this case may represent a warning that some plasma-derived products might contain residual prion infectivity, it should also be noted that it is the only case of its kind so far

reported and has always been somewhat controversial, as it couldn't be excluded that the patient was also exposed to other possible routes of infection for vCJD, such as via the food chain, transfusion with donor red cells or other surgical or invasive procedures<sup>72b</sup>. The surveillance described above emphasises the importance of the TMER study for identifying the risk of blood transfusion in transmitting vCJD. Moreover, national databases of blood donors and the maintenance of traceability from donor to recipient and vice versa are essential to find out whether a vCJD case has been a blood donor (UK experience has shown that questioning of family members is unreliable for establishing whether a patient has been a blood donor).

PrP<sup>TSE</sup> was detected in WBC and in buffy coat of vCJD patients by PMCA<sup>65</sup> and in whole blood from vCJD patients by steel binding assay<sup>82</sup>.

In a conventional mouse model (RIII mice), infectivity was not detected in the blood of two vCJD cases but the bioassay<sup>39</sup> had limited sensitivity to detect infectivity in peripheral tissues such as tonsil or spleen<sup>40</sup>. Bioassays carried out in PrP transgenic mice using blood harvested post mortem from a vCJD-affected patient have shown the presence of prion infectivity in red blood cells, plasma and white blood cells<sup>73</sup>. The blood fractions used in these assays had been prepared in 2000 using laboratory-scale haematological protocols but did not include leukoreduction. The infectious titre of whole blood in the bioassayed vCJD sample was estimated to be approximately 4.45 ID<sub>50</sub>/mL, which is 10<sup>-6</sup> - 10<sup>-7</sup> lower than that found in one gram of brain from a vCJD-affected patient at terminal stage of disease. Importantly, the leukocyte-associated prion infectivity of the vCJD blood sample could not be reduced by rinsing of the cells, similar to that found in ruminant animal models. These data support the view that prion infectivity levels in the blood of vCJD patients and different animal prion disease models are similar. They also demonstrated that interspecies variations exist with regards to distribution of infectivity in different blood fractions.

#### sCJD, iCJD:

Look-back studies in the UK<sup>74</sup> and USA<sup>75</sup> have not revealed any possible case of sporadic CJD linked to blood transfusion. However, these data are too scant to unequivocally exclude the possibility that such an event could occur in a small number of cases with a long (10 or more years) incubation period.

A review of transmission studies to detect infectivity in the blood of humans with sporadic and iatrogenic CJD shows that experimental transmissions in animal models have occasionally been reported in some studies<sup>76-80</sup> but not in others.<sup>81</sup> It is possible that PrP<sup>TSE</sup> is present at low levels in the blood of clinically affected cases of sCJD. Intracerebral inoculation of plasma from two of four sporadic CJD patients transmitted disease into human PrP overexpressing transgenic mice. Although this data should be evaluated with caution, these findings raised a concern that a certain level of infectivity could be present in plasma from donors incubating sCJD. The relative infectivity between brain and plasma was the same in sCJD and vCJD<sup>73</sup>. Data are lacking for gCJD and iCJD.

#### Risk assessments:

For the purpose of risk assessments, it is recommended that, as a worst case assumption, a relative efficiency of the intravenous and intracerebral routes of 1:1 should be used.<sup>83</sup> This is because the accumulated information now available from animal studies indicates that the intravenous route can be an efficient route of transmission and in certain cases can give a transmission rate and/or an incubation period similar to the intracerebral route (see also 4.1).

## 5. Detection techniques

The development of blood tests for vCJD has been a strategic priority but has suffered from declining efforts from an assumption that the technical challenges are insurmountable, an assumption that has seen commercial bodies abandoning test development.

As unique biological agents, mammalian prions provide many research challenges. Not least is the ability to detect and quantify their presence in tissue and fluid samples. The severity of pathology associated with clinical prion disease suggests markers for infection and disease progression other than abnormal PrP may exist. Numerous studies by groups worldwide<sup>84-90</sup> applied 'omics' approaches to discover alternative markers. Several differential changes between baseline and disease states have been demonstrated but they lack the specificity required for use in screening or diagnostic tests.

In contrast the deposition of PrP<sup>TSE</sup> is the archetypal marker of prion disease. Whilst abundant in the tissues of the central nervous system and lymphoreticular tissue in cases of vCJD, the concentration of infectivity, and by inference PrP<sup>TSE</sup>, is very low in blood and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF).

This situation is further complicated by the large background excess of normal non-pathogenic cellular protein PrP<sup>C</sup> associated with the cellular compartment of blood.

A conceptually obvious approach to overcome the problems of abnormal PrP detection is to exploit the innate propensity of amyloid to self-propagate. This approach has been developed in a variety of formats of which two: PMCA<sup>92</sup> and QuIC<sup>93</sup> have seen widespread adoption and development for research. The adoption of QuIC for the diagnosis of sporadic CJD using CSF samples has been successful with excellent although not perfect performance characteristics. However, adaptation of this methodology to the testing of blood samples has yet to be convincingly demonstrated. PMCA has been shown to be capable of detecting vCJD infection in blood<sup>65</sup> and urine<sup>94</sup>. However, the specificity of such an assay is generally considered to be a frailty of this approach. Two recent studies using PCMA showed 100% sensitivity at identification of blood samples from 14<sup>95</sup> or 18<sup>96</sup> clinical vCJD cases and indicated specificities in the range as required in the EU Common technical specification (CTS)<sup>97</sup>. However, full validation according to the CTS has not yet been performed.

As an alternative to amplification strategies, enrichment by capture using stainless steel beads has allowed the direct immunoassay of captured material, detecting a signal in blood in 71% (15 out of 21) of vCJD patients whilst being highly specific<sup>98</sup>.

It is clear that there are several methods in research and development that offer possibilities for routine screening and confirmatory assays but they have not yet completely demonstrated the current requirements of sensitivity and specificity as defined in the Common Technical Specifications.<sup>97</sup>

Comparison and validation of potential screening tests is considerably confounded by the paucity of blood samples from confirmed cases of clinical prion disease and very limited samples available from asymptomatic individuals who later developed vCJD. Some of the detection methods pose challenges for routine screening of blood donations considering amplification of infectious material and requirements for biosafety measures. A successful screening test for vCJD would generate additional challenges, including the ethical considerations involved in notifying donors that they have possible preclinical vCJD but that their risk of developing this lethal disease is uncertain<sup>98b</sup>.

## 6. Leucoreduction and specific prion affinity filters

Leucoreduction was introduced in the UK in 1999 as a precautionary measure in transfusion medicine to reduce the risk of iatrogenic transmissions of vCJD. The rationale was based upon evidence to suggest that the majority of infectivity in whole blood is associated with 'buffy coat' fractions or mononuclear cells.

Despite widespread exposure to potentially contaminated blood transfusions in the UK, Europe and the wider world, confirmed cases of vCJD resulting from exposure to contaminated blood or blood products are small<sup>72, 99, 100</sup>. This may be partly attributed to the rapid introduction of leucoreduction.

In addition to the potential protection afforded against vCJD transmission, leucoreduction has other benefits in transfusion medicine including reduced risk of HLA alloimmunisation with the potential for refractoriness to platelet transfusion, reduction in specific viral transmission risk, the disappearance of transfusion-related graft versus host disease and a significant decrease in cases of post-transfusion purpura<sup>101</sup>.

Experience from animal models indicates that leucoreduction may contribute for prion safety of blood transfusion. Taken together with the additional benefit of improved red blood cell and platelet quality, it is clear that leucoreduction is advantageous and is likely to remain in place irrespective of prion transmission risk assessments.

The Scientific Committee on Medicinal Products and Medical Devices (SCMPMD) opinion on leucoreduction<sup>9a, 9b</sup> for blood and blood components for transfusion stated that it might be a precautionary step to remove white cells as completely as possible. For plasma for fractionation the opinion stated the following:

'Taken together, there is no compelling scientific evidence to date for the introduction of leucoreduction of plasma for fractionation, or other methods aiming at removal of cells and debris, as a precaution against vCJD transmission.'

Considering the limited and incomplete prion reduction capacity, the impact of leucoreduction is negligible for plasma-derived products with high prion reduction capacity while it may be slightly more significant for the highest risk products with very limited prion reduction capacity. It should be noted that leucocyte content in plasma, is not much more or is similar than that in leucodepleted erythrocyte concentrates.

Results reported at the 2002 EMEA Workshop, suggested that leucoreduction does not cause fragmentation of cells and lysis. Results of a comprehensive study involving a number of different filters and procedures indicate that leucoreduction is not detrimental in terms of the generation of microvesicles or the release of prion proteins<sup>102</sup>.

Specific affinity ligands that bind prion proteins have been evaluated for their ability to further reduce TSE infectivity present in blood and plasma. Exogenous spiking experiments have suggested prion-specific filters could be effective. However, such studies do not provide a good model of infectivity distribution in blood. Experiments with endogenous infectivity have indicated that the efficiency of prion removal is not very effective with an overall logarithmic reduction value of only 1.22 from infectivity assay in a hamster model<sup>103</sup>.

In October 2009, the UK Advisory Committee on the Safety of Blood, Tissues and Organs (SaBTO) stated that there was sufficient evidence that a specific affinity ligand filter reduces infectivity and recommended the use of prion filtration of red cell components administered to children born since 1

January 1996. This recommendation was subject to the satisfactory completion of the PRISM clinical trial to evaluate the safety of prion filtered red blood cells<sup>104</sup>.

Despite the fact that PRISM has indicated that the use of commercially available prion filters was not detrimental to the quality or safety of filtered red blood cells, the use of prion reduction filters has not been recommended. This decision has been based upon the need for independent studies to replicate the findings of these studies since the studies involved the filter manufacturers.

Two such studies were commissioned and finally published in 2015. One, using a hamster model of prion disease concluded that the majority of infectivity was removed using leucoreduction alone, with filtration using the CE marked prion filter P-Capt (MacoPharma, France) achieving a further reduction in titre of around only 0.2 ID/ml.<sup>105</sup> The study was compromised by the low dynamic range afforded by the input material, however, residual infectivity was still present following combined leucoreduction and prion filtration and the low concentration was not statistically different from the residual levels following leucoreduction alone. The second study involved transfusion from scrapie-infected sheep and recipients received either leucoreduced blood or sequentially leucoreduced and P-Capt prion filtered blood<sup>106</sup>. This study also concluded that there was no significant difference in residual titre following only leucoreduction or leucoreduction and prion filtration. However, this study was also flawed in that all transfused materials were leucoreduced and the genotypes of recipient sheep were not disclosed so the possibility of resistant genotypes being transfused cannot be excluded. As a result, despite the large number of sheep used in the study, only two recipient animals were considered transfusion positive; one having received leucoreduced blood and the other receiving blood following combined leucoreduction and prion filtration. In conclusion, both studies failed to demonstrate a clear effect of the prion affinity filters.

The prion binding capacity of another affinity ligand chromatography step has been investigated in the processing of a plasma medicinal product using hamster brain derived spiking material.<sup>107, 108</sup> These data require further evaluation before conclusions can be drawn on possible efficacy.

## **7. Manufacturing processes for plasma-derived medicinal products**

Despite the fact that there is no firm evidence of transmission of CJD through plasma-derived medicinal products, infectivity has been detected in the plasma of both vCJD and sCJD affected patients<sup>73</sup>.

Taking account of the available data concerning blood infectivity, it is of utmost importance to investigate the capacities of the manufacturing process (fractionation) to eliminate/inactivate the infectious material potentially present in the plasma pool used as the starting material for preparation of plasma-derived products.

Initial results from animal studies, using blood from rodents, indicated that the fractionation process contributes to the decrease of infectivity in some fractionated products<sup>43, 45</sup>.

However, information reported at the EMA Workshops in 2002 and 2004 suggested that endogenous, rodent blood-associated infectivity might persist through the fractionation process to a greater extent than would be expected from spiking studies using brain-derived prion preparations, possibly because of the differing physical and biochemical properties of the associated infectious particles.

A significant number of studies aimed at investigating the partition/removal of Pr<sup>PTSE</sup> and/or infectivity during plasma fractionation process have been carried out using such spiking approaches<sup>109, 110</sup>.

The vast majority used rodent-adapted TSE agent (263K hamster strain) brain homogenate and microsomal brain fractions as a spike. They relied on direct PrP<sup>TSE</sup> immunodetection tools (western blot or conformation dependent immunoassay) to demonstrate a drop in the TSE agent content in processed fractions and on bioassay infectivity measurements to confirm the results. Generally, the limited sensitivity of these immuno-detection methods made necessary the use of a massive amount of TSE agent in the spike.

These studies established the potential contribution of the various manufacturing steps to the reduction of TSE agents (including precipitation followed by centrifugation or depth filtration, specific chromatographic steps and nanofiltration).

However, since 2004 and the publication of the EMA guideline on '*The investigation of manufacturing processes for plasma-derived medicinal products with regards to vCJD risk*', the knowledge of the prion area in general and the endogenous infectivity in blood in particular, have significantly evolved. Experimental studies highlighted the fact that prion removal capacity may vary according to the spiking preparation (dispersion and TSE agents strains) particularly for steps based on retention mechanisms<sup>111</sup>.

When there is no experience, it is recommended to use various forms of spike preparations in order to obtain an insight into their influence on prion reduction at the specific investigated step as compared to what has been published in the literature. In specific cases, it might be worth considering the use of blood from infected animals as an alternative material for investigation of early plasma processing steps, where feasible and where the overall prion reduction capacity seems limited or questionable.

It is still desirable to gain more knowledge about the form of infectivity present in blood (or in intermediates from manufacture) in order to confirm the relevance of the spiking material used in the validation studies.

The capacity of the manufacturing process to reduce prion infectivity remains a crucial prerequisite for the safety of plasma-derived medicinal products, as not only the risk due to known prion diseases, but also due to currently unknown or novel prion forms may be reduced.

## **8. Infectivity in urine**

### **8.1. Animal urine**

Low levels of infectivity have been detected in urine of scrapie-infected rodents by several research groups and in the urine of deer with CWD. Accordingly, urine has been reclassified among the category of "lower-infectivity tissues" by WHO<sup>10b</sup>.

Seeger *et al.*<sup>112</sup> have studied transmission via urine using mouse models of chronic inflammation. They have detected prionuria in scrapie infected mice with coincident chronic lymphocytic nephritis. Transmission has been shown upon intracerebral inoculation of purified proteins from pooled urine collected from scrapie sick or presymptomatic mice. In contrast, prionuria was not observed in scrapie infected mice displaying isolated glomerulonephritis without interstitial lymphofollicular foci or in scrapie infected wild type mice lacking inflammatory conditions.

Gregori *et al.*<sup>113</sup> demonstrated that the disease could be transmitted by intracerebral inoculation of pooled urine from scrapie-sick hamsters. The infectivity titre of the urine was calculated to be around 3.8 infectious doses/ml. Titration of kidney and urinary bladders from the same animals gave 20,000-fold greater concentrations. Histologic and immunohistochemical examination of these tissues showed no indication of inflammation or other pathologic changes, except for occasional deposits of disease-associated prion protein in kidneys.

Prionuria was also detected in CWD of deer. Experiments by Haley *et al.*<sup>114</sup> provided evidence that concentrated urine from deer at the terminal stage of the disease, that also showed mild to moderate nephritis histopathologically, was infectious when inoculated into transgenic mice expressing the cervid PrP gene. In addition, the urine collected from the CWD sick deer that was used for mouse inoculation, showed positive results when assayed for PrP<sup>TSE</sup> by serial rounds of PMCA assay. The concentration of abnormal prion protein was very low as indicated by undetectable PrP<sup>TSE</sup> by traditional assays and prolonged incubation periods and incomplete TSE attack rates in the transgenic mice.

Using the highly sensitive PMCA or RT-QuIC technologies, PrP<sup>TSE</sup> have been detected in urine of scrapie sick hamsters,<sup>115, 116, 117</sup> cervids with preclinical and clinical CWD<sup>118-121</sup> and sheep at preclinical and clinical stages of scrapie disease<sup>121</sup>. The concentration of PrP<sup>TSE</sup> in urine is, on average, 10- fold lower than in blood<sup>115</sup>.

## **8.2. Human urine**

Epidemiological evidence in the last decades, during which urine-derived medicinal products and particularly gonadotrophins have been widely used, does not suggest, at present, a risk from sporadic CJD. Since epidemiological evidence has identified few cases of iatrogenic transmission of CJD through the use of pituitary-derived gonadotrophins, it is possible that transmission from urine-derived gonadotrophins would have been detected if it had occurred. This is further supported by a recent study, in which prion infectivity in urine from a sCJD patient was not detected using bioassays in transgenic mice suggesting that prion infectivity in urine is either not present or was below the detection limit of 0.38 infectious units/ml<sup>122</sup>.

PrP<sup>TSE</sup> has been detected in the urine of patients with vCJD by using the highly sensitive PMCA technique<sup>94</sup>, but not in urine of sporadic CJD patients<sup>38, 94</sup>. However, the sensitivity of the PMCA detection for sCJD remained unassessed in these studies, raising concerns about the significance of these negative results. Abnormal PrP conformers were also detected in the urine of sCJD patients using an enrichment technique followed by an immunoassay. In this study, 8 of 20 sCJD cases tested positive while the analysis of 125 control samples (comprising 91 normal control individuals and 34 neurological disease control individuals), remained negative<sup>123</sup>.

## **9. Recommendations and proposals**

### **9.1. Sporadic, genetic and iatrogenic CJD and plasma-derived medicinal products**

In this revision, there is no change in the recommendations for donor selection. There is also no change in the recommendations for batch recalls. However, the potential additional contribution of the prion-reducing capacity of the manufacturing process is emphasised.

Donor selection criteria include criteria to exclude donors who might be at higher risk of developing CJD. The following permanent deferral criteria are specified in the Commission Directive 2004/33/EC: Persons who have a family history which places them at risk of developing a TSE, or persons who have received a corneal or dura mater graft, or who have been treated in the past with medicines made from human pituitary glands.

Precautionary recalls of batches of plasma-derived medicinal products after post-donation reports of CJD or CJD risk factors in a donor contributed to severe shortages of certain products<sup>10a</sup>.

The perception that plasma products and blood of sporadic CJD patients might contain prion infectivity has increased because of a transmission study with human blood in transgenic mice and the occurrence



of two cases in plasma product recipients. However, cumulative epidemiological evidence does not support transmission of sporadic, genetic and iatrogenic CJD by blood, blood components or plasma-derived medicinal products, although the statistical power of these epidemiological studies for tracing blood-related sCJD cases may not be sufficient to definitively exclude the possibility of blood transmission in a small number of cases. Therefore, the CHMP recommendation that a recall of plasma-derived medicinal products is not justified, where a donor is later confirmed as having sporadic, genetic or iatrogenic CJD or risk factors, is maintained provided the manufacturer has demonstrated using appropriate methodology that the process includes steps which will minimize any risk of prion contamination of the final product. The implementation of appropriate actions in relation to CJD depends on accurate diagnosis in suspected cases. There is still potential for diagnostic confusion between sporadic and variant CJD, particularly in younger age groups<sup>124</sup>.

## **9.2. Variant CJD and plasma-derived medicinal products**

Cases of vCJD have been declining worldwide. Clinical and epidemiological data from the UK does not reveal any infection via transfusion since 1999. Nevertheless, it remains still difficult to definitely exclude long time carriers or re-emergence of cases. There is no screening test to detect donors who may be incubating the disease or in the early clinical stages. Therefore, other approaches are necessary.

The following measures are considered adequate for minimising the risk of transmission of the agent by plasma-derived medicinal products.

### **9.2.1 Exclusion Criteria**

#### **Consideration of Country-based exclusions**

##### ***UK plasma***

In the years following the vCJD outbreak (1980s-1990s), residence in the UK was considered a recognised risk factor for vCJD and led to the UK deciding no longer to fractionate UK plasma.

This decision was made because of the perceived risk to plasma-derived medicinal products recipients, at a time when the potential scale of the epidemic was very uncertain.

More than 20 years after that decision was taken, the decline of vCJD cases in the UK population, as well as worldwide, has been more rapid than it was initially predicted in the 1990s. This has led UK to re-examine that decision based on current scientific and clinical data. The conclusions of the risk assessment carried out for the UK Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) have led the UK authorities to conclude that this precautionary measure is no longer required.

In April 2021, the UK Government published their risk assessment concluding to lift the ban on the use of UK-sourced plasma for the manufacture of immunoglobulins<sup>126a</sup> and in August 2023, the UK Government concluded that UK-sourced plasma can be used for the manufacture of albumin medicinal products<sup>126b</sup>, in addition to the already approved use for the manufacture of immunoglobulins.

The United States, Australia, Ireland and Hong Kong have recently lifted their deferrals of blood donors with a history of living in the UK. This has been decided following separate reviews concluding that there is currently no significant difference in the risk posed by using/not using the plasma from donors that have spent time in the UK.

### ***Exclusion of donors based on cumulative period of time spent in the UK***

In the past, UK donors were excluded from donating plasma for the manufacture of plasma-derived medicinal products in the UK. Consequently, it was consistent to exclude donors who have spent long periods in the UK. The rationale for this recommendation was to exclude donors who have the highest individual risk due to their stay in the UK and to be consistent with the UK decision to not fractionate UK plasma. This was supported by the finding of vCJD cases in other countries, which had a risk factor of long periods spent in the UK. The appendix studies originally caused concern that there could be a large number of people in the UK incubating the disease (with long incubation period). However, the decline of vCJD cases has been more rapid than predicted and no second wave of cases has been observed until now.

The following observations lead to the decision that the exclusion of donors having spent time in the UK is no longer considered necessary, as plasma from these donors (or plasma from the UK) is no longer considered to pose a health risk for recipients of plasma-derived medicinal products:

- No transfusion-transmitted cases have been observed since 1999 despite ongoing transfusion of blood components and continuing surveillance in the UK.
- Modern manufacturing processes include prion-removal steps that minimize the risk of transmission.
- The risk from plasma donations in the UK has decreased considering the decline of vCJD cases in the UK
- France, the country where second most vCJD cases were reported, has continued to fractionate plasma over the last 20 years and there have been no transmissions of vCJD through blood components or plasma-derived medicinal products.

In light of the emerging clinical and epidemiological scientific evidence, it is now considered that these facts support the decision that the fractionation of plasma from donors who have spent a cumulative period of 1 year or more in the UK between 1980 and 1996 is no longer considered to pose a health risk. Therefore, the exclusion of donors having spent time in the UK is no longer requested.

### ***French plasma and plasma from other BSE-exposed European countries***

Endogenous vCJD cases occurred in France and some other countries. (see Section 2. Human TSEs current status).

France published several risk assessments on transmission of vCJD by blood and plasma sourced derivatives<sup>125a, 125b</sup>. It was concluded that plasma collected in France could continue to be used for fractionation. The safety margin for plasma-derived medicinal products was considered to be sufficient. However, introduction of additional steps to further increase the safety margin of some products was recommended (e.g. nanofiltration of Factor VIII introduced in January 2001).

Leucoreduction for plasma for fractionation, as for plasma for transfusion products, was also recommended in 2001 as a precautionary measure. The subsequent risk-analyses re-confirmed these conclusions and acknowledged that the estimated size of the epidemic had been reduced by modeling, and the risk associated with collecting blood from vCJD-incubating donors was lower than previously estimated<sup>125a, 125b</sup>.

Exclusion of donors who have spent a cumulative period of time in France or other countries is not recommended.

### **Concluding remarks**

Country-based exclusions are no longer recommended considering the worldwide decline of vCJD cases. There is a lack of spare plasma capacity to make up for shortfalls if countries that are major producers of plasma-derived medicinal products discontinue the use of nationally collected plasma for fractionation.

### **9.2.2. Leucoreduction and specific prion affinity filters**

The benefit of inclusion of leucoreduction to improve the safety of plasma for fractionation has not been demonstrated. At present it is not appropriate to recommend the introduction of leucoreduction for the safety of plasma-derived products. Efficacy of introducing recently developed affinity media / filters to blood or plasma has been investigated. Although they might have some effect in reducing prion loads, clear evidence for their use in providing protection against transmission is still uncertain.

### **9.2.3. Manufacturing processes for plasma-derived medicinal products**

The available data support the reduction of infectivity by steps in the manufacturing process and prion reduction capacity is considered an important factor for the safety of plasma-derived medicinal products. Although vCJD cases have been declining, producing purified plasma proteins using steps that reduce prions is considered a precautionary measure for potentially re-emerging vCJD cases or other blood-transmitted prion diseases that might emerge in future. Considering the very long incubation period and severity of prion diseases, it is important to maintain precautionary measures as far as possible. Manufacturers are required to estimate the potential of their specific manufacturing processes to reduce infectivity. The estimation should follow a stepwise approach as described and illustrated in the flow diagram below.

It is recommended that manufacturers consult the relevant competent authorities at each of the milestones in this estimation. A decision to add a further manufacturing step(s) to increase reduction capacity should only be made after careful consideration of all benefit-risk factors for a certain product.

Firstly, manufacturers should compare their own processes to those with published data on reduction of infectivity in order to estimate the theoretical potential of their specific manufacturing processes to reduce infectivity. (*Flow diagram, step 1*)

Whereas the general information available on manufacturing processes provides useful background information, the actual effectiveness of a manufacturing process might be dependent on the specific process conditions. Manufacturers should consider the relevance of the published data to their specific manufacturing processes and whether the removal capacity can be expected to be comparable. If it cannot be concluded that the removal capacity would be expected to be comparable, it is recommended that manufacturers undertake product-specific investigational studies on key steps in their manufacturing processes using biochemical assays. Priority should be given to studies on products with the lowest potential removal capacity. (*Flow diagram, step 2*)

Investigations using biochemical assays may be sufficient if a clear correlation with infectivity data has already been established for this assay. Only in specific cases, if such a correlation is uncertain (e.g. a novel step) and the step is considered critical for the removal of infectivity for a specific product (e.g. it is the only step for removal), the investigations should be confirmed using an infectivity assay for the critical step(s). (*Flow diagram, step 3*)

The above steps will allow manufacturers to estimate the reduction capacity of their manufacturing processes. (*Flow diagram, step 4*)

In cases where the overall reduction capacity is limited, manufacturers should consider the addition of steps that may increase the removal capacity where this is feasible without compromising the safety, quality and availability of the existing products. Discussion with the relevant competent authorities is recommended. (*Flow diagram, step 5*)


The outcome of the estimates of the theoretical potential of manufacturing processes to reduce infectivity and the results of product-specific investigational studies should be reported to the relevant competent authorities for the medicinal products concerned, as information becomes available.

Applicants submitting new marketing authorisation applications for plasma-derived medicinal products will be expected to include such information in the application dossier. The outcome of the estimation of the theoretical potential to reduce infectivity should always be included in the application.

In support of these recommendations, CHMP's Biologics Working Party, with the involvement of external experts, has developed guidance on how to investigate manufacturing processes with regard to vCJD risk<sup>5a</sup>.

Figure 1: Plasma-Derived Medicinal Products: estimation of potential reduction capacity of specific manufacturing processes

**Important Note:** this flow diagram should be read in conjunction with the preceding text in 9.2.3. It is recommended to consult the relevant competent authorities at the milestones in this estimation. Give priority to studies on products with the lowest potential removal capacity.



### 9.2.4. Recall of batches where information becomes available post-donation

In view of the lack of adequate information on vCJD, it is prudent to recall batches and intermediates of plasma-derived medicinal products where a donor to a plasma pool subsequently develops vCJD. Recall should also include medicinal products containing plasma-derived products as excipients (see also 9.2.5).

However, in both cases, consequences for essential medicinal products where alternatives are not available will need careful consideration by the competent authorities.

In cases where a post-mortem differentiation between vCJD and other types of CJD is not possible or not yet available, it can be justified not to recall affected batches or product intermediates upon risk assessment including the epidemiology, clinical data from the donor, and prion reduction capacity of the manufacturing process.

On the contrary, if there are epidemiological indications, clinical tests, or signs typical of a variant form, it is recommended, as a precautionary measure to recall batches or intermediates of plasma-derived medicinal products. Recall should also include medicinal products containing plasma-derived products as excipients.

A case-by-case consideration would be appropriate where plasma-derived products have been used in the manufacture of other medicinal products. This consideration would include the nature of the product, the amount used, where it is used in the manufacturing process and the downstream processing.

Look-back to identify the fate of donations should be taken as far as possible in case of confirmed or suspected variant CJD. Regulatory authorities, Official Medicines Control Laboratories, surveillance centres and the supply chain should be informed of all batches of product and intermediate implicated whether or not supplies of the batch are exhausted.

### **9.2.5. Albumin used as an excipient or in manufacturing processes**

The available data on the removal of infectivity during the fractionation process used in the manufacture of albumin indicates that the risk of transmission of infectivity by albumin would be particularly low. Where a donor to a plasma pool subsequently develops vCJD in the case of albumin used as an excipient, a recall should be considered. However, a careful case-by-case risk analysis taking into account the estimated capacity of the process to remove infectivity and the amount of albumin incorporated in the medicinal product could justify not needing a recall. A single batch of albumin may be used to produce a number of batches of a medicinal product because of the small amounts that are typically used as an excipient. As a consequence, a recall could affect complete stocks of a product and create severe shortages.

### **9.2.6. Substitution with alternative products**

Use of alternative products to plasma-derived medicinal products could be considered, where these are available. It is felt that this choice should remain with users, taking into account the needs of the individual patient. When considering recombinant products as alternative, it should be noted that plasma-derived products such as albumin may be used in the manufacture of recombinant products.

## **9.3. Urine-derived medicinal products**

The recommendations for urine-derived medicinal products are based on the following considerations:

- There is at present no epidemiological evidence of CJD and vCJD transmission by urine-derived medicinal products.
- TSE infectivity in urine has been reported in some animal models.
- Abnormal PrP has been detected by different methods in 40% of sCJD patient urine samples and 93% of vCJD samples.

The review of manufacturing processes is described below.

Urine should be collected from countries where there is a surveillance system for both human and animal TSEs unless otherwise justified. Based on the limited data on human exposure to BSE-risk materials in other countries, it is still difficult to estimate the epidemiological risk in those countries which have a small number of vCJD cases or may have a TSE exposure risk.

For particular products, such as hormones from a relatively small well-defined donor population, some manufacturers have put in place limited exclusion criteria for the selection of a donor for inclusion in a donor panel. For other products manufactured from very large donor pools (e.g. urokinase), such measures are more difficult to apply. The use of exclusion criteria for selection for a donor panel is encouraged. The same exclusion criteria as explained above in this document should be applied with respect to vCJD and other types of CJD as used for blood/plasma donors providing starting material for the manufacture of plasma-derived medicinal products. Manufacturers should follow up the donor criteria at defined intervals. The exclusion of donors with known inflammation of the kidneys and/or chronic renal inflammatory diseases is encouraged.

Manufacturers are required to estimate the potential of their specific manufacturing processes to reduce infectivity following the same general, stepwise approach as recommended for plasma-derived medicinal products (see Section 9.2.3). Extrapolation of results for plasma-derived medicinal products is not justified particularly for chromatographic steps at the beginning of the manufacturing process because of the high protein content in plasma. Investigational studies of infectivity reduction by the manufacturing processes should address potential accumulation of infectivity/PrP<sup>TSE</sup> on chromatographic columns or a potential batch-to-batch contamination due to carry-over of infectivity/PrP<sup>TSE</sup>. For inactivation studies, investigation of different TSE strains should be considered as they may vary in resistance.

General review of the manufacturing processes indicates that, in each manufacturing process, there is at least one step that might be theoretically capable of reducing infectivity if it was present in the starting material. In cases where the reduction capacity is limited, manufacturers should consider the addition of steps that may increase the overall removal capacity.

Record keeping for traceability is recommended for products where it is possible to trace back to donor level.

## References

1. Will RG, Ironside JW, Zeidler M, Cousens SN, Estbeiro K, Alperovitch A, Poser S, Pocchiari M, Hofman A, Smith PG. A new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the UK. *Lancet* 1996; 47:921-25.
2. Bruce ME, Will RG, Ironside JW, McConnell I, Drummond D, Suttle A, McCardle L, Chree A, Hope J, Birkett C, Cousens S, Fraser H, Bostock CJ. Transmissions to mice indicate that "new variant" CJD is caused by the BSE agent. *Nature* 1997;389:498-501.
3. Hill AF, Desbruslais M, Joiner S, Sidle KCL, Gowland I, Collinge J. The same prion strain causes vCJD and BSE. *Nature* 1997;389:448-450.
4. Scott MR, Will R, Ironside J, Nguyen HO, Tremblay P, DeArmond SJ, Prusiner SB. Compelling transgenic evidence for transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy prions to humans. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci* 1999;96:15137-15142.

## 5. EMA

5a Guideline on the investigation of manufacturing processes for plasma-derived medicinal products with regard to vCJD risk. October 2004, EMEA/CPMP/BWP/5136/03

<https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/investigation-manufacturing-processes-plasma-derived-medicinal-products-regard-variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-risk-scientific-guideline>

5b CPMP Position Statement on Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and plasma-derived and urine-derived medicinal products. February 2003, EMEA/CPMP/BWP/2879/02.

<https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-and-plasma-derived-and-urine-derived-medicinal-products-scientific-guideline>

5c Summary Report of EMEA Expert Meeting on Human TSEs and medicinal products derived from human blood and plasma, 1 December 2000, EMEA/CPMP/BWP/450/01, 28 March 2001.

<https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/committees/working-parties-other-groups/chmp/biologics-working-party/biologics-working-party-documents>

5d EMEA Workshop on application to pharmaceuticals of assays for markers of TSE, February 1999, CPMP/BWP/257/99. [https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/report/emea-workshop-application-pharmaceuticals-assays-markers-tse-held-19-20-january-1999-report-cmp-biotechnology-working-party\\_en.pdf](https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/report/emea-workshop-application-pharmaceuticals-assays-markers-tse-held-19-20-january-1999-report-cmp-biotechnology-working-party_en.pdf)

5e CPMP Position Statement on New variant CJD and plasma-derived medicinal products, February 1998, CPMP/201/98. [https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/scientific-guideline/cmp-position-statement-new-variant-cjd-and-plasma-derived-medicinal-products-superseded-cmpbwp287902\\_en.pdf](https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/scientific-guideline/cmp-position-statement-new-variant-cjd-and-plasma-derived-medicinal-products-superseded-cmpbwp287902_en.pdf)

5f Report on Expert Workshop on CJD Risk and Urine-derived medicinal products EMEA, London - 12-13 July 2007 EMEA/CHMP/BWP/472717/2009

[https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/report/report-expert-workshop-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-risk-and-urine-derived-medicinal-products\\_en.pdf](https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/report/report-expert-workshop-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-risk-and-urine-derived-medicinal-products_en.pdf)

5g CHMP position statement on Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and plasma-derived and urine-derived medicinal products. 23 June 2011 EMA/CHMP/BWP/303353/2010

<https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-and-plasma-derived-and-urine-derived-medicinal-products-scientific-guideline>

6. Llewelyn CA, Hewitt PE, Knight RSG, Amar K, Cousens S, Mackenzie J, Will RG. Possible transmission of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease by blood transfusion. *Lancet* 2004;363:417-421.

## 7. European Commission

7a Directive 2002/98/EC of the European Parliament and Council setting standards of quality and safety for the collection, testing, processing, storage and distribution of human blood and blood components and amending Directive 2001/83 EC, OJ L 33, 8.2.2003, pp. 30-40. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:033:0030:0040:EN:PDF>

7b Commission Directive 2004/33/EC implementing Directive 2002/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards certain technical requirements for blood and blood components, OJ L 91, 30.3.2004, pp.25-39. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:091:0025:0039:EN:PDF>



7c Council Recommendation of 29 June 1998 on the suitability of blood and plasma donors and the screening of donated blood in the European Community (98/463/EC), OJ L 203 pp.14-26. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:203:0014:0026:EN:PDF>

7d Statement of Commissioner Byrne on possible vCJD transmission by blood. Brussels, 18 December 2003, IP/03/1781. <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1781&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

7e Summary Statement of Technical Meeting of Blood Experts related to vCJD transmission. Luxembourg 20 January 2004, D(2004) FMD/360007.

8. 21st edition of the Guide to the preparation, use and quality assurance of blood components (Blood Guide). Technical appendix to Council of Europe Recommendation No. R(95)15.
9. European Commission: SCMPMD, SSC, SCENIHR

#### SCMPMD

9a Opinion on the Safety of Human-Derived Products with Regard to TSE's, adopted on 18 January 2002. [http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph\\_risk/committees/scmp/documents/out40\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/scmp/documents/out40_en.pdf)

9b Opinion on update of the opinion on the Risk Quantification for CJD Transmission via Substances of Human Origin, adopted on 16 February 2000. [http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph\\_risk/committees/scmp/documents/out28\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/scmp/documents/out28_en.pdf)

9c Opinion on the Policy Regarding the Use of Blood and Blood Products adopted by Written Procedure on 24 March 1999. [http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific\\_committees/emerging/opinions/scmpmd/scmp\\_out20\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/opinions/scmpmd/scmp_out20_en.htm)

9d Opinion on the risk quantification for CJD transmission via substances of human origin, adopted on 21/10/98. [http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph\\_risk/committees/scmp/documents/out12\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/scmp/documents/out12_en.pdf)

#### SSC

9e Opinion on the Implications of the Recent Papers on Transmission of BSE by Blood Transfusion in Sheep (Houston et al, 2000; Hunter et al, 2002), adopted September 2002. [https://food.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e63912e9-29e3-40ea-9bbf-54780492a611\\_en?filename=sci-com\\_ssc\\_out280\\_en.pdf](https://food.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e63912e9-29e3-40ea-9bbf-54780492a611_en?filename=sci-com_ssc_out280_en.pdf)

9f Opinion on the Implications of the Houston et al paper in The Lancet of 16 September 2000 on the Transmission of BSE by blood transfusion in sheep. (The Lancet, Vol.356, pp999- 1000;955-956;1013). [http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out143\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out143_en.pdf)

9g Oral exposure of Humans to the BSE agent: infective dose and species barrier adopted by the SSC at its meeting of 13-14 April 2000 following a public consultation via Internet between 6 and 27 March 2000. [https://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out79\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out79_en.pdf)

9h Opinion on the Human Exposure Risk (HER) via food with respect to BSE - Adopted on 10 December 1999. [http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out67\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out67_en.pdf)

#### SCENIHR

9i Opinion on the Safety of Human-derived Products with regard to Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease adopted on 11-12 May 2006. [http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph\\_risk/committees/04\\_scenihr/docs/scenihr\\_o\\_004b.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_004b.pdf)

## 10. WHO

10a. WHO Guidelines on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies in relation to Biological and Pharmaceutical Products. 2003. <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-guidelines-on-transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathies>

10b. WHO Tables on Tissue Infectivity Distribution in Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies. Updated 2010. [Microsoft Word - WHO TSE 19Feb10 web.doc](#)

11a. Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2001)4 on the prevention of the possible transmission of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) by blood transfusion.

[http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/health/recommendations\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/health/recommendations_en.asp)

11b. ECDC TECHNICAL REPORT Risk assessment: The risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease transmission via blood and plasma-derived medicinal products manufactured from donations obtained in the United Kingdom, August 2021. Available online: <https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/risk-assessment-risk-variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-transmission-blood>

11c. ECDC TECHNICAL REPORT Variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease in donors of blood and plasma having temporarily resided in or visited the United Kingdom, January 2023. Available online: <https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/variant-creutzfeldt-jacob-disease-donors-blood-and-plasma-having-temporarily>

11d. Béringue V, Herzog L, Jaumain E, Reine F, Sibille P, Le Dur A, Vilotte JL, Laude H. Facilitated cross-species transmission of prions in extraneural tissue. *Science*. 2012 Jan 27;335(6067):472-5. doi: 10.1126/science.1215659. PMID: 22282814.

12. Ladogana A, Puopolo M, Croes EA, Budka H, Jarius C, Collins S, Klug GM, Sutcliffe T, Giulivi A, Alperovitch A, Delasnerie-Laupretre N, Brandel JP, Poser S, Kretschmar H, Rietveld I, Mitrova E, Cuesta Jde P, Martinez-Martin P, Glatzel M, Aguzzi A, Knight R, Ward H, Pocchiari M, van Duijn CM, Will RG, Zerr I. Mortality from Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and related disorders in Europe, Australia, and Canada. *Neurology*. 2005;64:1586-91.

13. Dorsey K, Zou S, Schonberger LB, Sullivan M, Kessler D, Notari E 4th, Fang CT, Dodd RY. Lack of evidence of transfusion transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in a US surveillance study. *Transfusion* 2009;49: 977-984.

14. Urwin P, Thanigaikumar K, Ironside JW, Molesworth A, Knight RS, Hewitt PE, Llewelyn C, Mackenzie J, Will RG. Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in 2 Plasma Product Recipients, United Kingdom. *Em Inf Dis*. 2017;6: 893-7.

15. Diack AB, Ritchie DL, Peden AH, Brown D, Boyle A, Morabito L, Maclennan D, Burgoyne P, Jansen C, Knight RS, Piccardo P, Ironside JW, Manson JC. Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy, a unique prion variant with inefficient transmission properties. *Emerg Infect Dis*. 2014;20:1969- 79.

16. Notari S, Xiao X, Espinosa JC, Cohen Y, Qing L, Aguilar-Calvo P, Kofskey D, Cali I, Cracco L, Kong Q, Torres JM, Zou W, Gambetti P. Transmission characteristics of variably protease-sensitive prionopathy. *Emerg Infect Dis*. 2014;20:2006-14.

17. Variant CJD Cases Worldwide Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease International Surveillance Network. [(accessed on 1 September 2023)]. Available online: [https://www.eurocjd.ed.ac.uk/data\\_tables](https://www.eurocjd.ed.ac.uk/data_tables).

18. National CJD Research & Surveillance Unit (NCJDRSU). Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance in the UK, 30th annual report 2021. NCJDRSU, University of Edinburgh. 2021. Available online: <https://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/sites/default/files/report30.pdf>

19. Worldwide vCJD statistics. <https://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/surveillance/data-and-reports>
20. Brandel JP, Vlaicu MB, Culeux A, Belondrade M, Bougard D, Grznarova K, et al. Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Diagnosed 7.5 Years after Occupational Exposure. *N Engl J Med*. 2020 Jul 2;383(1):83-5. Available online: <https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMc2000687>
21. Mok T, Jaunmuktane Z, Joiner S, Campbell T, Morgan C, Wakerley B, Golestani F, Rudge P, Mead S, Jäger HR, Wadsworth JD, Brandner S, Collinge J. Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in a Patient with Heterozygosity at PRNP Codon 129. *NEJM* 2017;376:292-294.
22. Hilton DA, Ghani AC, Conyers L, Edwards P, McCardle L, Ritchie D, Penney M, Hegazy D, Ironside JW. Prevalence of lymphoreticular prion protein accumulation in UK tissue samples. *Journal of Pathology* 2004;203:733-739.
23. Ironside JW, Bishop MT, Connolly K, Hegazy D, Lowrie S, Le Grice M, Ritchie DL, McCardle LM, Hilton DA. Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: prion protein genotype analysis of positive appendix tissue samples from a retrospective prevalence study. *BMJ*. 2006;332:1186-8.
24. Ghani AC, Donnelly CA, Ferguson NM, Anderson RM. Updated projections of future vCJD deaths in the UK. *BMC Infect Dis* 2003;3:4.
25. Clewley JP, Lelly CM, Andrews N, Vogliqi K, Mallinson G, Kaiser M, Hilton DA, Ironside JW, Edwards P, McCardle LM, Ritchie DL, Dabaghian, R, Ambrose HE, Gill ON. Prevalence of disease-related prion protein in anonymous tonsil specimens in Britain: cross sectional opportunistic study. *BMJ* 2009;338:b1442.
26. De Marco MF, Linehan J, Gill ON, Clewley JP, Brandner S. Large-scale immunohistochemical examination for lymphoreticular prion protein in tonsil specimens collected in Britain. *J Pathol* 2010;222:380-387.
27. Gill ON, Spencer Y, Richard-Loendt A, Kelly C, Dabaghian R, Boyes L, Linehan J, Simmons M, Webb P, Bellerby P, Andrews N, Hilton DA, Ironside JW, Beck J, Poulter M, Mead S, Brandner S. Prevalent abnormal prion protein in human appendixes after bovine spongiform encephalopathy epizootic: large scale survey. *BMJ*. 2013 Oct;347:f5675.
28. Gill ON, Spencer Y, Richard-Loendt A, Kelly C, Brown D, Sinka K, Andrews N, Dabaghian R, Simmons M, Edwards P, Bellerby P, Everest DJ, McCall M, McCardle LM, Linehan J, Mead S, Hilton DA, Ironside JW, Brandner S. Prevalence in Britain of abnormal prion protein in human appendixes before and after exposure to the cattle BSE epizootic. *Acta Neuropathol*. 2020 Jun;139(6):965-976. doi: 10.1007/s00401-020-02153-7
29. Balkema-Buschmann A, Eiden M, Hoffmann C, Kaatz M, Ziegler U, Keller M, Groschup MH. BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrP<sup>Sc</sup> accumulation in the tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle. *J Gen Virol* 2011;92:467-476.
30. Piccardo P, Manson J, King D, Ghetti B, Barron RM. Accumulation of prion protein in the brain that is not associated with transmissible disease. *PNAS* 2007;104:4712-4717.
31. Tixador P, Herzog L, Reine F, Jaumain E, Chapuis J, Le Dur A, Laude H, Beringue V. The physical relationship between infectivity and prion protein aggregates is strain-dependent. *PLoS Pathog*. 2010;6:e1000859.
32. Safar JG, Geschwind MD, Deering C, Didorenko S, Sattavat M, Sanchez H, Serban A, Vey M, Baron H, Giles K, Miller BL, Dearmond SJ, Prusiner SB. Diagnosis of human prion disease. *PNAS* 2005; 102:3501-3506.

33. Choi YP, Groner A, Ironside JW, Head MW. Comparison of the level, distribution and form of disease-associated prion protein in variant and sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob diseased brain using conformation-dependent immunoassay and Western blot. *J Gen Virol* 2011;92:727–732.
34. Wadsworth JD, Joiner S, Hill AF, Campbell TA, Desbruslais M, Luthert PJ, Collinge J. Tissue distribution of protease resistant prion protein in variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease using a highly sensitive immunoblotting assay. *Lancet* 2001;358:171-180.
35. Head MW, Ritchie D, Smith N, McLoughlin V, Nailon W, Samad S, Masson S, Bishop M, McCardle L, Ironside JW. Peripheral tissue involvement in sporadic, iatrogenic, and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: an immunohistochemical, quantitative, and biochemical study. *American Journal of Pathology* 2004;164:143-153.
36. Glatzel M, Abela E, Maissen M, Aguzzi A. Extraneural pathologic prion protein in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *New England Journal of Medicine* 2003;349:1812-1820.
37. Mead S, Wadsworth JF, Porter M, Linehan JM, Pietkiewicz W, Jackson GS, Brandner S, Collinge J. Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease with extremely low lymphoreticular deposition of prion protein. *JAMA Neurol* 2014;71:340–343.
38. Rubenstein R, Chang B. Re-Assessment of PrPSc Distribution in Sporadic and Variant CJD. *PLoS ONE* 2013;8:e66352.
39. Bruce ME, McConnell I, Will RG, Ironside JW. Detection of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease infectivity in extraneural tissues. *Lancet* 2001;358:208-209.
40. Halliez S, Reine F, Herzog L, Jaumain E, Haïk S, Rezaei H, Vilotte JL, Laude H, Béringue V. Accelerated, spleen-based titration of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease infectivity in transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with sensitivity comparable to that of survival time bioassay. *J Virol*. 2014;88:8678-86.
41. Bishop MT, Diack AB, Ritchie DL, Ironside JW, Will RG, Manson JC. Prion infectivity in the spleen of a PRNP heterozygous individual with subclinical variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease. *Brain* 2013;136:1139–1145.
42. Peden AH, Ritchie DL, Head MW, Ironside JW. Detection and localization of PrPSc in the skeletal muscle of patients with variant, iatrogenic, and sporadic forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *Am J Pathol*. 2006;168:927-935.
- 42b. Douet JY, Lacroux C, Aron N, Head MW, Lugan S, Tillier C, Huor A, Cassard H, Arnold M, Beringue V, Ironside JW, Andréoletti O. Distribution and Quantitative Estimates of Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Prions in Tissues of Clinical and Asymptomatic Patients. *Emerg Infect Dis*. 2017 Jun;23(6):946-956. doi: 10.3201/eid2306.161734.
43. Brown P, Rohwer RG, Dunstan BC, MacAuley C, Gajdusek DC, Drohan WN. The distribution of infectivity in blood components and plasma derivatives in experimental models of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy. *Transfusion* 1998;38:810-816.
44. Cervenakova L, Yakovleva O, McKenzie C, Kolchinsky S, McShane L, Drohan WN, Brown P. Similar levels of infectivity in the blood of mice infected with human-derived vCJD and GSS strains of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy. *Transfusion* 2003;43:1687-1694.
45. Brown P, Cervenáková L, McShane LM, Barber P, Rubenstein R, Drohan WN. Further studies of blood infectivity in an experimental model of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, with an explanation of why blood components do not transmit Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. *Transfusion* 1999;39:1169-1178.

46. Gregori L, Lambert BC, Gurgel PV, Gheorghiu L, Edwardson P, Lathrop JT, MacAuley C, Carbonell RG, Burton SJ, Hammond D, Rohwer RG. Reduction of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy infectivity from human red blood cells with prion affinity ligands. *Transfusion* 2006; 46: 1152-1161
47. Holada K, Vostal JG, Theisen PW, MacAuley C, Gregori L, Rohwer RG. Scrapie infectivity in hamster blood is not associated with platelets. *J Virol.* 2002 76:4649-4650.
48. Bons N, Lehmann S, Mestre-Francès N, Dormont D, Brown P. Brain and buffy coat transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy to the primate *Microcebus murinus*. *Transfusion* 2002;42:513-516.
49. Lescoutra-Etcheagaray N, Jaffré N, Sumian C, Durand V, Correia E, Mikol J, Luccantoni-Freire S, Culeux A, Deslys JP, Comoy EE. Evaluation of the protection of primates transfused with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease-infected blood products filtered with prion removal devices: a 5-year update. *Transfusion.* 2015;1231-41.
50. Lacroux C, Vilette D, Fernández-Borges N, Litaïse C, Lugan S, Morel N, Corbière F, Simon S, Simmons H, Costes P, Weisbecker JL, Lantier I, Lantier F, Schelcher F, Grassi J, Castilla J, Andréoletti O. Prionemia and leukocyte-platelet-associated infectivity in sheep transmissible spongiform encephalopathy models. *J Virol.* 2012;86:2056-66.
51. Andréoletti O, Litaïse C, Simmons H, Corbière F, Lugan S, Costes P, Schelcher F, Vilette D, Grassi J, Lacroux C. Highly efficient prion transmission by blood transfusion. *PLoS Pathog.* 2012; 8(6):e1002782.
52. Mathiason CK, Hayes-Klug J, Hays SA, Powers J, Osborn DA, Dahmes SJ, Miller KV, Warren RJ, Mason GL, Telling GC, Young AJ, Hoover EA. B cells and platelets harbor prion infectivity in the blood of deer infected with chronic wasting disease. *J Virol.* 2010;84:5097-5107.
53. Ironside JW. Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: risk of transmission by blood transfusion and blood therapies. *Haemophilia.* 2006; Suppl 1:8-15.
54. Houston F, Foster JD, Chong A, Hunter N, Bostock CJ. Transmission of BSE by blood transfusion in sheep. *Lancet* 2000;356:999-1000.
55. Hunter N, Foster J, Chong A, McCutcheon S, Parnham D, Eaton S, MacKenzie C, Houston F. Transmission of prion diseases by blood transfusion. *Journal of General Virology* 2002;83:2897-2905.
56. Lacroux C, Bougard D, Litaïse C, Simmons H, Corbière F, Dernis D, Tardivel R, Morel N, Simon S, Lugan S, Costes P, Weisbecker JL, Schelcher F, Grassi J, Coste J, Andréoletti O. Impact of leukocyte depletion and prion reduction filters on TSE blood borne transmission. *PLoS One.* 2012;7(7):e42019.
57. McCutcheon S, Alejo Blanco AR, Houston EF, de Wolf C, Tan BC, Smith A, Groschup MH, Hunter N, Hornsey VS, MacGregor IR, Prowse CV, Turner M, Manson JC. All clinically-relevant blood components transmit prion disease following a single blood transfusion: a sheep model of vCJD. *PLoS One.* 2011;6(8):e23169.
58. Douet JY, Lacroux C, Litaïse C, Lugan S, Corbière F, Arnold M, Simmons H, Aron N, Costes P, Tillier C, Cassard H, Andréoletti O. Mononucleated Blood Cell Populations Display Different Abilities To Transmit Prion Disease by the Transfusion Route. *J Virol.* 2016;90:3439-45.
59. Salamat MKF, Blanco ARA, McCutcheon S, Tan KBC, Stewart P, Brown H, Smith A, de Wolf C, Groschup MH, Becher D, Andréoletti O, Turner M, Manson JC, Houston EF. Preclinical transmission

of prions by blood transfusion is influenced by donor genotype and route of infection. *PLoS Pathog.* 2021 Feb 18;17(2): e1009276. doi: 10.1371/journal.ppat.1009276

60. Castilla J, Saá P, Soto C. Detection of prions in blood. *Nat Med.* 2005;11:982-5.
61. Saá P, Yakovleva O, de Castro J, Vasilyeva I, De Paoli SH, Simak J, Cervenakova L. First demonstration of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy-associated prion protein (PrP<sup>TSE</sup>) in extracellular vesicles from plasma of mice infected with mouse-adapted variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease by in vitro amplification. *J Biol Chem.* 2014;289:29247-60.
62. Elder AM, Henderson DM, Nalls AV, Hoover EA, Kincaid AE, Bartz JC, Mathiason CK. Immediate and Ongoing Detection of Prions in the Blood of Hamsters and Deer following Oral, Nasal, or Blood Inoculations. *J Virol.* 2015;89:7421-4.
63. Sawyer EB, Edgeworth JA, Thomas C, Collinge J, Jackson GS. Preclinical detection of infectivity and disease-specific PrP in blood throughout the incubation period of prion disease. *Sci Rep.* 2015; 5:17742.
64. Properzi F, Logozzi M, Abdel-Haq H, Federici C, Lugini L, Azzarito T, Cristofaro I, di Sevo D, Ferroni E, Cardone F, Venditti M, Colone M, Comoy E, Durand V, Fais S, Pocchiari M. Detection of exosomal prions in blood by immunochemistry techniques. *J Gen Virol.* 2015;96:1969-74.
65. Lacroux C, Comoy E, Moudjou M, Perret-Liaudet A, Lugan S, Litaise C, Simmons H, Jas-Duval C, Lantier I, Béringue V, Groschup M, Fichet G, Costes P, Streichenberger N, Lantier F, Deslys JP, Vilette D, Andréoletti O. Preclinical detection of variant CJD and BSE prions in blood. *PLoS Pathog.* 2014;10:e1004202.
66. Halliez S, Jaumain E, Huor A, Douet JY, Lugan S, Cassard H, Lacroux C, Béringue V, Andréoletti O, Vilette D. White blood cell-based detection of asymptomatic scrapie infection by ex vivo assays. *PLoS One.* 2014;9:e104287.
67. McDowell KL, Nag N, Franco Z, Bu M, Piccardo P, Cervenak J, Deslys JP, Comoy E, Asher DM, Gregori L. Blood reference materials from macaques infected with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease agent. *Transfusion.* 2015;55:405-12.
68. Murayama Y, Masujin K, Imamura M, Ono F, Shibata H, Tobiume M, Yamamura T, Shimosaki N, Terao K, Yamakawa Y, Sata T. Ultrasensitive detection of PrP(Sc) in the cerebrospinal fluid and blood of macaques infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion. *J Gen Virol.* 2014;95:2576-88.
69. Gillies M, Chohan G, Llewelyn CA, MacKenzie J, Ward HJ, Hewitt PE, Will RG. A retrospective case note review of deceased recipients of vCJD-implicated blood transfusions. *Vox Sang* 97: 211- 218, 2009.
70. Peden AH, Head MW, Ritchie DL, Bell JE, Ironside JW. Preclinical vCJD after blood transfusion in a PRNP codon 129 heterozygous patient. *Lancet.* 2004, 7-13;364:527-9
71. Bishop MT, Diack AB, Ritchie DL, Ironside JW, Will RG, Manson JC. Prion infectivity in the spleen of a PRNP heterozygous individual with subclinical variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *Brain.* 2013;136:1139-45.
72. Peden A, McCardle L, Head MW, Love S, Ward HJ, Cousens SN, Keeling DM, Millar CM, Hill FG, Ironside JW. Variant CJD infection in the spleen of a neurologically asymptomatic UK adult patient with haemophilia. *Haemophilia* 2010, 16:296-304.

- 72b. Bennett P, Ball J (UK Department of Health). vCJD risk assessment calculations for a patient with multiple routes of exposure. 5 June 2009. Available online: <https://www.infectedbloodinquiry.org.uk/sites/default/files/6701-%206910%20copy/6701-%206910%20copy/WITN7034039%20-%20vCJD%20Risk%20Assessment%20Calculations%20for%20a%20Patient%20with%20Multiple%20Routes%20of%20Exposure%20-%2005%20Jun%202009.pdf>
73. Douet JY, Zafar S, Perret-Liaudet A, Lacroux C, Lugan S, Aron N, Cassard H, Ponto C, Corbière F, Torres JM, Zerr I, Androletti O. Detection of infectivity in blood of persons with variant and sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *Emerg Infect Dis*. 2014;20:114-7.
74. Urwin PJM, Mackenzie JM, Llewelyn CA, Will RG, Hewitt PE. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and blood transfusion: updated results of the UK Transfusion Medicine Epidemiology Review Study. *Vox Sanguinis*. 2016;110:310-316.
75. Crowder LA, Schonberger LB, Dodd RY, Steele WR. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease lookback study: 21 years of surveillance for transfusion transmission risk. *Transfusion*. 2017;57:1875-1878.
76. Manuelidis EE, Kim JH, Mericangas JR, Manuelidis L. Transmission to animals of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease from human blood. *Lancet* 2: 896-7, 1985.
77. Tateishi J. Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease from human blood and urine into mice. *Lancet* 2: 1074, 1985.
78. Tamai Y, Kojima H, Kitajima R, Taguchi F, Ohtani Y, Kawaguchi T, Miura S, Sato M, Ishihara Y. Demonstration of the transmissible agent in tissue from a pregnant woman with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *N Engl J Med* 327: 649, 1992.
79. Deslys JP, Lasmézas C, Dormont D. Selection of specific strains in iatrogenic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *Lancet* 343: 848-849, 1994.
80. Cervenakova L, Brown P, Hammond DJ, Lee CA, Saenko EL. Review article: Factor VIII and transmissible spongiform encephalopathy: the case for safety. *Haemophilia* 2002;8:63-75.
81. Brown P, Gibbs CJ Jr, Rodgers-Johnson P, Asher DM, Sulima MP, Bacote A, Goldfarb LG, Gajdusek DC. Human spongiform encephalopathy: the National Institutes of Health series of 300 cases of experimentally transmitted disease. *Ann Neurol* 35: 513-529, 1994.
82. Edgeworth JA, Farmer M, Sicilia A, Tavares P, Beck J, Campbell T, Lowe J, Mead S, Rudge P, Collinge J, Jackson GS. Detection of prion infection in variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a blood-based assay. *Lancet* 2011, 377:487-493.
83. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee June 12th 2009. [www.fda.gov/TransmissibleSpongiformEncephalopathyAdvisoryCommittee](http://www.fda.gov/TransmissibleSpongiformEncephalopathyAdvisoryCommittee) .
84. Miele G, Manson J, Clinton M: A novel erythroid-specific marker of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. *Nat.Med*. 2001, 7:361-364.
85. Feng L, Gell DA, Zhou S, Gu L, Kong Y, Li J, Hu M, Yan N, Lee C, Rich AM, Armstrong RS, Lay PA, Gow AJ, Weiss MJ, Mackay JP, Shi Y. Molecular mechanism of AHSP-mediated stabilization of alpha-hemoglobin. *Cell* 2004, 119:629-640.
86. Cepek L, Brechlin P, Steinacker P, Mollenhauer B, Klingebiel E, Bibl M, Kretschmar HA, Wiltfang J, Otto M. Proteomic Analysis of the Cerebrospinal Fluid of Patients with Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease. *Dement.Geriatr.Cogn Disord*. 2006;23:22-28.

87. Chiang YW, Otoshima Y, Watanabe Y, Inanami O, Shimoyama Y. Dynamics and Local Ordering of Spin-Labeled Prion Protein: An ESR Simulation Study of a Highly PH-Sensitive Site. *J Biomol Struct Dyn* 2008, 26:355-366.
88. Brown AR, Blanco AR, Miele G, Hawkins SA, Hopkins J, Fazakerley JK, Manson J, Clinton M. Differential expression of erythroid genes in prion disease. *Biochem Biophys Res Commun* 2007, 364:366-371.
89. Quattieri A, Urso E, Pera ML, Sprovieri T, Bossio S, Gambardella A, Quattrone A. Proteomic profiling of cerebrospinal fluid in Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *Expert Rev Proteomics* 2010, 7:907-917.
90. Appleford NE, Wilson K, Houston F, Bruce LJ, Morrison A, Bishop M, Chalmers K, Miele G, Massey E, Prowse C, Manson J, Will RG, Clinton M, MacGregor I, Anstee DJ. Alpha-Hemoglobin stabilizing protein is not a suitable marker for a screening test for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *Transfusion* 2008,48:1616-1626.
91. Atarashi R, Moore RA, Sim VL, Hughson AG, Dorward DW, Onwubiko HA, Priola SA, Caughey B: Ultrasensitive detection of scrapie prion protein using seeded conversion of recombinant prion protein. *Nat Methods* 2007, 4:645-650.
92. Saborio GP, Permanne B, Soto C: Sensitive detection of pathological prion protein by cyclic amplification of protein misfolding. *Nature* 2001, 411:810-813.
93. McGuire LI, Poleggi A, Poggiolini I, Suardi S, Grznarova K, Shi S, De Vil B, Sarros S, Satoh K, Cheng K, Cramm M, Fairfoul G, Schmitz M, Zerr I, Cras P, Equestre M, Tagliavini F, Atarashi R, Knox D, Collins S, Haik S, Parchi P, Pocchiari M, Green A: CSF RT-QuIC is a robust and reliable test for sporadic CJD: An international study. *Ann Neurol* 2016;80:160-5.
94. Moda F, Gambetti P, Notari S, Concha-Marambio L, Catania M, Park KW, Maderna E, Suardi S, Haik S, Brandel JP, Ironside J, Knight R, Tagliavini F, Soto C: Prions in the urine of patients with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *N Engl J Med* 2014;371:530-539.
95. Concha-Marambio, L., Pritzkow, S., Moda, F., Tagliavini, F., Ironside, J. W., Schulz, P. E., & Soto, C. (2016). Detection of prions in blood from patients with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *Science Translational Medicine*, 8(370), [370ra183]. DOI: 10.1126/scitranslmed.aaf6188
96. Bougard D et al. Detection of prions in the plasma of presymptomatic and symptomatic patients with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *Sci Transl Med* 2016 Dec 21; 8:370ra182.  
<https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/scitranslmed.aag1257>
97. Guideline for the CE marking of blood based in vitro diagnostic medical devices for vCJD based on detection of abnormal PrP. European commission DG Health and Consumer Directorate. 2012.  
[http://ec.europa.eu/health/medical-devices/files/meddev/2\\_14\\_4\\_ol\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/health/medical-devices/files/meddev/2_14_4_ol_en.pdf).
98. Jackson GS, Burk-Rafel J, Edgeworth JA, Sicilia A, Abdilahi S, Korteweg J, Mackey J, Thomas C, Wang G, Schott JM, Mummery C, Chinnery PF, Mead S, Collinge J. Population Screening for Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Using a Novel Blood Test: Diagnostic Accuracy and Feasibility Study. *JAMA Neurol* 2014, 71:340.
- 98b. Watson, N., Brandel, JP., Green, A. et al. The importance of ongoing international surveillance for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *Nat Rev Neurol* 17, 362-379 (2021).  
<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41582-021-00488-7>.



99. Wroe SJ, Pal S, Siddique D, Hyare H, Macfarlane R, Joiner S, Linehan J, Brandner S, Wadsworth JD, Hewitt P, Collinge J: Clinical presentation and pre-mortem diagnosis of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease associated with blood transfusion: a case report. *Lancet* 2006, 368:2061-2067.
100. Hewitt PE, Llewelyn CA, Mackenzie J, Will RG: Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and blood transfusion: results of the UK Transfusion Medicine Epidemiological Review study. *Vox Sang.* 2006, 91:221-230.
101. Cohen H, Bolton-Maggs P: Breaking records in blood transfusion safety. *Transfus.Med* 2012, 22:241-243.
102. Krailadsiri P, Seghatchian J, Macgregor I, Drummond O, Perrin R, Spring F, Prescott R, Williamson L, Prowse C, Anstee D, Turner M. The effects of leukodepletion on the generation and removal of microvesicles and prion protein in blood components. *Transfusion* 2006;46:407-17.
103. Gregori L, Gurgel PV, Lathrop JT, Edwardson P, Lambert BC, Carbonell RG, Burton SJ, Hammond DJ, Rohwer RG. Reduction in infectivity of endogenous transmissible spongiform encephalopathies present in blood by adsorption to selective affinity resins. *Lancet* 2006; 368: 2226-2230.
104. SaBTO minutes meeting 27 Oct 2009.  
[http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod\\_consum\\_dh/groups/dh\\_digitalassets/@dh/@ab/documents/digitalasset/dh\\_108860.pdf](http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@ab/documents/digitalasset/dh_108860.pdf)
105. McLeod NP, Nugent P, Dixon D, Dennis M, Cornwall M, Mallinson G, Watkins N, Thomas S, Sutton JM. Evaluation of efficacy of prion reduction filters using blood from an endogenously infected 263K scrapie hamster model. *Transfusion* 2015;55:2390-7.
106. McCutcheon S, Alejo Blanco AR, Tan BC, Gonzalez L, Martin S, Mallinson G, Appleford NE, Turner ML, Manson JC, Houston EF: A prion reduction filter does not completely remove endogenous prion infectivity from sheep blood. *Transfusion* 2015;55:2123-33.
107. Neisser-Svae A, Bailey A, Gregori L, Heger A, Jordan S, Behizad M, Reichl H, Romisch J, Svae T- E. Prion removal effect of a specific affinity ligand introduced into the manufacturing process of a pharmaceutical quality solvent/detergent (S/D)-treated plasma OctaplasLG®. *Vox Sanguinis* 2009 2009;97:226-33.
108. Heger A, Bailey A, Neisser-Svae A, Ertl M, Römisch J, Svae TE. Removal of prion infectivity by affinity ligand chromatography during OctaplasLG® manufacturing--results from animal bioassay studies. *Vox Sang.* 2012;102:294-301.
109. Foster PR, Removal of TSE agents from blood products. *Vox Sang.* 2004 Jul;87 Suppl 2:7-10.
110. Cai K, Gröner A, Dichtelmüller HO, Fabbri F, Flechsig E, Gajardo R, von Hoegen I, Jorquera JI, Kempf C, Kreil TR, Lee DC, Moscardini M, Pölsler G, Roth NJ. Prion removal capacity of plasma protein manufacturing processes. A data collection from PPTA member companies. *Transfusion.* 2013;53:1894-905.
111. Cardone F, Simoneau S, Arzel A, Puopolo M, Berardi VA, Abdel-Haq H, Galeno R, De Pascalis A, Sbriccoli M, Graziano S, Valanzano A, Porte P, Diringier H, Brown P, Flan B, Pocchiari M. Comparison of nanofiltration efficacy in reducing infectivity of centrifuged versus ultracentrifuged 263K scrapie-infected brain homogenates in "spiked" albumin solutions. *Transfusion.* 2012, 52:953-62.

112. Seeger H, Heikenwalder M, Zeller N, Kranich J, Schwarz P, Gaspert A, Seifert B, Miele G, Aguzzi A. Coincident scrapie infection and nephritis lead to urinary prion excretion. *Science* 2005;310: 324–326.
113. Gregori L, Kovacs GG, Alexeeva I, Budka H, Rohwer RG. Excretion of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy infectivity in urine. *Emerg Infect Dis.* 2008;14:1406-12.
114. Haley NJ, Seelig DM, Zabel MD, Telling GC, Hoover EA. Detection of CWD Prions in Urine and Saliva of Deer by Transgenic Mouse Bioassay. *PLoS ONE* 2009; 4(3): e4848.
115. Gonzalez-Romero D, Barria MA, Leon P, Morales R, Soto C (2008) Detection of infectious prions in urine. *FEBS Lett* 582: 3161–3166.
116. Murayama Y, Yoshioka M, Okada H, Takata M, Yokoyama T, Mohri S. (2007) Urinary excretion and blood level of prions in scrapie-infected hamsters. *J Gen Virol* 88: 2890–2898.
117. Chen B, Morales R, Barria MA, Soto C. Estimating prion concentration in fluids and tissues by quantitative PMCA. *Nat Methods.* 2010;7:519-20.
118. Haley NJ, Mathiason CK, Carver S, Zabel M, Telling GC, Hoover EA. Detection of chronic wasting disease prions in salivary, urinary, and intestinal tissues of deer: potential mechanisms of prion shedding and transmission. *J Virol.* 2011;85:6309-18.
119. Henderson DM, Denkers ND, Hoover CE, Garbino N, Mathiason CK, Hoover EA. Longitudinal Detection of Prion Shedding in Saliva and Urine by Chronic Wasting Disease-Infected Deer by Real-Time Quaking-Induced Conversion. *J Virol.* 2015;89:9338-47.
120. John TR, Schätzl HM, Gilch S. Early detection of chronic wasting disease prions in urine of pre-symptomatic deer by real-time quaking-induced conversion assay. *Prion.* 2013;7:253-8.
121. Rubenstein R, Chang B, Gray P, Piltch M, Bulgin MS, Sorensen-Melson S, Miller MW. Prion disease detection, PMCA kinetics, and IgG in urine from sheep naturally/experimentally infected with scrapie and deer with preclinical/clinical chronic wasting disease. *J Virol.* 2011;85:9031-8.
122. Notari S, Qing L, Pocchiari M, Dagdanova A, Hatcher K, Dogterom A, Groisman JF, Lumholtz IB, Puopolo M, Lasmezas C, Chen SG, Kong Q, Gambetti P. Assessing prion infectivity of human urine in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. *Emerg Infect Dis.* 2012;18:21-8.
123. Luk C, Jones S, Thomas C, Fox NC, Mok TH, Mead S, Collinge J, Jackson GS. Diagnosing Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease by the Detection of Abnormal Prion Protein in Patient Urine. *JAMA Neurol.* 2016;73:1454-1460.
124. Brandel JP, Galanaud D, Freeman L, Laplanche JL, Haik S Variant or sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease? *The Lancet*, Vol. 375 No. 9718 p 889; 2010.
125. AFSSaPS
- 125a Analyse du risque de transmission de la variante de la maladie de Creutzfeldt-Jakob (vMCJ) et de la forme sporadique de la maladie de Creutzfeldt-Jakob par les produits de santé d'origine humaine– Septième actualisation des travaux du groupe d'experts pluridisciplinaire. Rapport de juillet 2009.  
[https://archive.ansm.sante.fr/var/ansm\\_site/storage/original/application/31d59f6c76604b48cfbfc1a332a8ee64.pdf](https://archive.ansm.sante.fr/var/ansm_site/storage/original/application/31d59f6c76604b48cfbfc1a332a8ee64.pdf)
- 125b Analysis of the risk of transmission of variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease by health products and by tissues and fluids of human origin – Update of findings of ad hoc group report of December 2000 – Report of February 2004.

[https://archive.ansm.sante.fr/var/ansm\\_site/storage/original/application/6d641179224f6b2d485d25c3383827ad.pdf](https://archive.ansm.sante.fr/var/ansm_site/storage/original/application/6d641179224f6b2d485d25c3383827ad.pdf)

126. GOV.UK

126a Critical risk assessment report: use of UK plasma for the manufacture of immunoglobulins and vCJD risk - GOV.UK. Published 21 April 2021

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/critical-risk-assessment-report-use-of-uk-plasma-for-the-manufacture-of-immunoglobulins-and-vcjd-risk/critical-risk-assessment-report-use-of-uk-plasma-for-the-manufacture-of-immunoglobulins-and-vcjd-risk>

126b Use of UK plasma for the manufacture of albumins and vCJD risk - GOV.UK. Published 15 August 2023

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-uk-plasma-for-the-manufacture-of-albumins-and-vcjd-risk>